Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
International Conference on African
Development Archives

Center for African Development Policy
Research

8-2001

From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: the Sideslips of Ethiopian
Elitism
Messay Kebede
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive
Part of the African Studies Commons, and the Economics Commons

WMU ScholarWorks Citation
Kebede, Messay, "From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: the Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism" (2001).
International Conference on African Development Archives. 12.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/africancenter_icad_archive/12

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by
the Center for African Development Policy Research at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in International Conference on African Development
Archives by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks
at WMU. For more information, please contact wmuscholarworks@wmich.edu.

From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: the Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism
Messay Kebede,
University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio
For many scholars, colonialism and neocolonial policies remain the root causes of
Africa’s numerous impediments, ranging from the persistence of poverty to the ravages
of ethnic conflicts. However, the number of scholars who prefer to ascribe these
impediments essentially to the persistence of traditional views and methods and to the
lack of reforms radical enough to trigger a sustained process of modernization is not
negligible. My position contests this either-or debate and identifies the culprit as the rise
of African elitism--a phenomenon implicating the specific effect of colonialism in
conjunction with internal African contributions. I take the case of Ethiopia as a pertinent
illustration of the precedence of elitism over other hindrances. The fact that Ethiopia,
though not colonized, has followed the same declining course as other African countries
underlines the derailing role of modern education whose embedded Eurocentric
orientations were quick to uproot those sectors of Ethiopian society which were exposed
to it. The outcome was elitism, which spearheaded the trend of deeper marginalization
and incapacitation of the country. But first, let me give a concrete meaning to the concept
of elitism.
What Is Elitism?
The determination of elitism as a characteristic effect of colonial rule is not hard to
establish. The first scholar who drew attention to the phenomenon of elitism in Africa is a
Western missionary by the name of Placide Tempels. In his controversial book, Bantu
Philosophy, written in 1945, Tempels defends the idea that the Bantu people have a
rationally constructed philosophy. The revolutionary message of the book is easily
admitted when it is recalled that the denial of philosophy, which was almost a universal
European attitude, was the manner the rationality of Africans was contested. Since the
denial was none other than the justification of colonialism as a civilizing mission, it is no
surprise if many African scholars hail Tempels as “a real revolutionary, both in
philosophy and in anticolonial discourse.”1
In addition to refuting the colonial allegation of irrational and immature peoples,
Tempels has reflected on the evil consequences of denying philosophy to native peoples.
The trend of considering the African cultural legacy as a collection of irrational and
absurd beliefs, he noted, turned the clearing of the African mind of these beliefs into a
prerequisite for the inculcation of Western ideas. Instead of dialogue and exchange of
ideas, acculturation thus took the direction of uprooting natives on the grounds that they
would become fit for Westernization only through the removal of their cultural legacy.
Tempels consistently blames this colonial method for causing irreparable damages,
especially for accelerating dehumanization and loss of centeredness among the Bantu. “In
condemning the whole gamut of their supposed ‘childish and savage customs’ by the
judgment ‘this is stupid and bad’, we [missionaries] have taken our share of the
responsibility for having killed ‘the man’ in the Bantu,”2 he writes.
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A characteristic result of this inhuman method is the advent of the
évolués–a French term to characterize those natives who supposedly evolve into civilized
Africans as a result of colonial education. Tempels has no kind words to describe the
évolués. He calls them from the start “déracinés and degenerates”3; elsewhere he speaks
of them as “empty and unsatisfied souls--would be Europeans--and as such, negations of
civilized beings,” as “moral and intellectual tramps, capable only, despite themselves, of
being elements of strife.”4 All these severe flaws point the finger at colonial methods:
molded to despise their legacy, these uprooted Africans have so internalized the colonial
attitude that they end up by nurturing a contempt for their own peoples similar to that of
the colonizer. To show that colonial education produces people with a colonizing turn of
mind, Tempels stresses that the évolués “have no longer any respect for their old
institutions, or for the usages and customs which, nevertheless, by their profound
significance, form the basis of the practical application in Bantu life of natural law.”5
Since the primary function of the évolués is to serve as a local instrument of colonial rule,
their teaching, training, and mode of life dispose them to construe the dislike of their own
legacy as a norm of civilized behavior.
In particular, when on top of being cut off from their society and pristine beliefs
these évolués feel in their bones the inhumanity of their colonial masters, what else could
rise within them but disillusionment and general cynicism? How can they avoid cynicism
when, for all the loss of commitment to their tradition they have gone through, the
colonial society still rejects them? Is it surprising if these would-be Europeans internalize
all the vices of the colonizer without assimilating any of the positive aspects of
modernity? Tempels fully understands the awkward position of the évolués: mesmerized
by the power of the colonizer, yet repulsed by his racist contempt. He defines them as
“profoundly distrustful or embittered,” by the obvious lack of “recognition of and respect
for their full value as men by the Whites.”6 Because their hopes have been raised only to
be knocked down without mercy, humiliation is for these people a source of constant
torment. So mortifying is their humiliation that it seeks appeasement even in
manifestations of eccentricity and megalomania, obvious as it is that the need to impress
the colonizer at all costs grows into an itch.
This means that the opposition of the évolués to colonial rule hides deeper
emotional disorders of the kind pushing them toward negative and destructive behaviors.
In this respect, the error has been to take at face value the rebellious stand of the évolués.
No doubt, their role has been decisive in the struggle for independence. But one thing is
to rise against an alien rule, quite another to develop an independent policy and turn of
mind. To overlook this distinction is to miss the extent to which the perpetuation of the
colonial rule under the guise of independence remains the appalling reality of Africa.
Let us agree to call African elitism the entitlement to an uncontested leadership
inferred from the privilege of being exposed to modern education. The inference singles
out the évolués as heirs to the civilizing mission. It is as though Westernization passes on
to local elites the right to rule, that is, to continue the unfinished business of colonialism.
3
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In other words, to rule is still a civilizing mission with this difference that it is
assumed by natives rescued from primitiveness. The entitlement to rule maintains the
belief that Africans are indeed primitive, and so calls for methods of government similar
to the colonial rule. The reality of native rulers thinking and acting like former colonizers
makes up the substance of African elitism. Basil Davidson has described well the process
of its institution thus:
The regimes installed at independence became rapidly subject to upsets and
uproars. Striving to contain these, the multi-party parliamentary systems gave way
increasingly, whether in theory or practice, to one-party system. Most of these
one-party systems at this stage, perhaps all of them, decayed into no-party
systems as their ruling elements became fully bureaucratized. Politics came to an
end; mere administration took its place, reproducing colonial autocracy as the new
‘beneficiaries’ took the place of the old governors.7
.
Colonialism, it follows, remains the major source of hindrance not so much by its
plunders and destructions--which though not negligible were nevertheless reparable--as
by its ideological legacy. The colossal human wreckage caused by the internalization of
the colonial discourse and so aptly personified by the évolués is how Africa was handed
over to psychopathic personalities.
To be specific, what defines elitism is the normative union of knowledge with
power, that is, the assumption that those who get exposed to Western education should
also rule. Behind this entitlement to rule, we find the ethos of the évolués who, having
internalized the Western discourse, take on the task of rescuing their society from
barbarism and ignorance. It is because modernization is perceived as a passage from
savagery to civilization that knowledge, enlightenment entitles one to power. So defined,
modernization construes power as tutorship, and so designates the educated elite as the
legitimate heir to colonial rule. The situation, then, is that educated Africans present
themselves, in the words of Davidson,
as those who were to be the instruments of applying the European model to
Africa, and therefore as the saviours of the continent. Being sure of the values of
their Western education, they were convinced of their superiority over their vast
majority: who but they, after all, possessed the keys to the powerhouse of
knowledge whence European technology and conquest had flowed?8
The assignment to civilize completely redefines the role of the state. According to
the influential liberal theory, modern states implicate a contract of citizens among
themselves and with the government as a result of which the latter becomes accountable
to the former. Classical Marxist theory insists that the contract does not involve the
working people, there being no doubt that governments protect the interests of ruling
classes. The attribution of a modernizing role to the state adds a civilizing mission to the
normal administrative and political functions of the state. In other words, following the
colonial paradigm, from representative of social forces the state grows into a tutor. And
who can direct this state if not those natives who have access to Western knowledge.
7
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Since civilization must come from outside, power must become tutorship. This
equation produces elitism in all its various forms.
One African scholar who has closely studied the phenomenon of elitism and its
negative effects is V. Y. Mudimbe. Specifically referring to “elitism and Western
dependency,”9 Mudimbe shows that both are products of Africans talked into the
smearing of African past and legacy by Western indoctrination. The proven method of
the indoctrination is “the static binary opposition between tradition and modernity”10
whose consequence is to rule out the presentation of modernity as an extension, a
continuation of tradition. Pushed to the other side of modernity, tradition appears as the
major obstacle that must be liquidated for evolution to take off. The consent to this
liquidation precisely produces the évolué as the one who, having a foot in both the
modern and traditional worlds, best promotes the hierarchical order of colonialism by
serving as a reliable liaison between colonized and colonizers.
It scarcely need be pointed out that the acquiescence of Africans to the colonial
description of African tradition is what nurtures the elitist mentality by reviving the
évolué sleeping in every “educated” African. It causes a characteristic blur assimilating
the use of colonial conceptions and methods to an enlightened and positive approach. As
a result of this mix-up,
the indigenous societies of Africa will be not so much transformed as replaced by
modern, secular societies; and the key agents of this process will be indigenous
elites, including business elites or capitalists, conceive of as bearers of the
necessary universal values of global modernity.11
As substitutes for colonizers and in default of being able to whiten themselves, the
évolués resolve on a condescending and paternalistic attitude which, however far it falls
short of being racist, is nevertheless entitlement to privilege and uncontested leadership.
To sum up, the elitist attitude echoes the colonial mentality means that the moral
bankruptcy of the educated elite is a direct consequence of the endorsement of the idea of
primitive Africa. The act by which Africans welcome Western education is the act by
which they acquiesce to the colonial discourse on Africa: the one is inseparable from the
other. As a result, educated Africans are unable to adopt a moral standard: the contempt-mostly unconscious--that they feel for Africanness totally deprives them of ethical
relationships with themselves and their original society. Disdain and non-accountability
appear to them as the only way by which they demonstrate their complete emancipation
from their legacy. Imperative, therefore, is the recognition as a major explanation of
African numerous impediments the fact that modern African states have simply replaced
the colonial states. Because “Africans replaced the Europeans officials right to the top of
the bureaucracy”12 without the prior dismantling of the colonial state and methods,
especially without a far-reaching decolonization of the educated and political elites, small
wonder the same structure and turn of mind produce similar results.
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The Ethiopian Drift into Elitism
A noticeable and important distinction between Ethiopia and other African countries is,
we know, its escape from colonization after a decisive military victory in 1896 over a
colonial power. Combined with the other distinctive characteristics of Ethiopia, namely,
the protracted existence of an Ethiopian state (the so-called Solomonic dynasty) with a
well-defined class structure (the gebar system) and a nationalist ideology (the Kibre
Negest), the repulsion of colonial aggression announced the inevitability of the rise of an
African power on a par with modern European states. So promising was the prospect that
many observers predicted the repetition of the Japanese experience by Ethiopia. To show
that expectation was high in Europe, especially after the victory of Adwa, a Paris journal,
La liberté editorialized: "All European countries will be obliged to make a place for this
new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark continent the role of Japan in the
Far East."13
In light of this expectation, the failure and underdevelopment of Ethiopia turn into
an appalling enigma, all the more so as the usual explanation of the African impediment
by colonialism is here ruled out. Ethiopia escaped colonization means essentially that
power and ideological leadership did not devolve on the évolués. Instead, there was a
remarkable continuity, as evidenced by the opening of Ethiopia to the modern world
through the agency of its traditional ruling elite. So that, this fact of Ethiopia becoming
underdeveloped while no leadership of the évolué type hampered its evolution seems to
backfire on my thesis ascribing the African predicament to elitism. If there is one country
in Africa that was protected against the rise of the évolués, this country was Ethiopia.
Let us not rush to conclusions, however. Ethiopia’s escape from the political
domination of colonialism must be viewed against the background of the large doors that
it naïvely opened to Western education in the name of modernization. In our study of the
évolués, we have emphasized that the disastrous consequences of colonial conquest result
less from economic and social disruptions than from mental colonization. Accordingly,
the reckless opening of Ethiopia to modern education brings us back to the same issue of
elitism with even greater strength, since we catch the uprooting and alienating effect of
such an education working in a sovereign way. It shows that the inglorious and
cumbersome conquest of Africa was not necessary: to achieve the colonization of the
mind, with its set of marginalizing thinking, copyism, and dictatorial methods, in short,
elitism, the spreading of Western education was enough.
Nowhere is this truth better illustrated than in the radicalization of Ethiopian
student movements and educated circles in the 60s and 70s. True, this radicalism
implicates Haile Selassie’s postponement of necessary social and political reforms. But
the postponement does not fully explain the shift to radicalism: a predisposition
portraying the ills of Ethiopian society as so entrenched and stubborn that nothing less
than a radical reshuffling was required must be added to the lack of reforms. The
overwhelming dominance of revolutionary mood over reformist tendencies cannot be
satisfactorily explained otherwise than by the corrosive effects of Western education on
the student movements and intelligentsia. The dichotomy between tradition and
13
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modernity and the subsequent presentation of the break with tradition as a necessary
precondition of modernization--this bedrock of Western education--explains the leaning
toward revolutionary analyses to the detriment of reformist remedies.
This analysis finds a remarkable support in Tekeste Negash’s book, The Crisis of
Ethiopian Education. In that book, Tekeste brings out the essentially uprooting role that
modern education has assumed in Ethiopia during Haile Selassie's reign and, with greater
reason, during Derg’s “socialist” rule. In his eyes, the teaching of a "boundless hatred of
their country and its society"14 to students has been the main purpose of modern
education. Its outcome has been the elitist mentality, which talked students into
perceiving themselves as "infallible semi-gods"15 destined for undivided leadership.
Tekeste traces back the origin of this megalomania to the ideological vacuum created by
the distortion and neglect of the teaching of Ethiopian history. Taught only in grade ten,
Ethiopian history was pictured by textbooks, especially by those of the Derg, as the
unspeakable reign of a rotten feudal system whose backwardness and limitless
exploitation of peasants condemned the country to be one of the poorest nations in the
world. In thus squarely blaming tradition and the past for the present ills without
balancing it with an account of the positive side, the history course amounted to an
infusion of "shame, contempt and disgust."16 Such remarkable realizations as the
evolving of "a political state that endured for nearly two thousand years" and the
achievement of a rich and varied culture which integrated different ethnic groups into "a
functioning political framework"17 were systematically downplayed.
This grave deficiency together with the systematic pursuit of debasement
prompted Tekeste to speak of a "curriculum" with a "strikingly colonial character."18
Even though, unlike the Derg, Haile Selassie had constantly pleaded for an approach
balancing tradition and modernity, his prudence was nullified by his reliance on a
massive foreign teaching corps whose commitment to Ethiopian interests was peripheral
as well as by his intention to use modern education to consolidate his own autocratic rule.
The debasement has today reached its climax with the establishment of an ethnic regime
and the proliferation of ethnic movements whose grudges against the Ethiopian state,
however legitimate they may be, are so excessive and one-sided that they echo the
colonial disparagement of whatever is natively African. On the strength of his conviction
that "underdevelopment cannot be overcome until such time when the citizens of a
country begin to appreciate their history,"19 Tekeste advises that "the cultivation of
Ethiopian nationalism and patriotism . . . deserves priority."20
The history of Ethiopian intellectual movement squarely confirms the merit of
this analysis. Let us take the case of the first intellectuals, those whose contributions took
place before the Italian occupation of 1935. Addis Hiwet called them “Japanizers”
because they who saw in the transformation of the post-Meiji modernization of Japan “a
living model for Ethiopia: the liquidation of feudalism and the development of capitalism
14
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through the agency of the modern state--i.e. a revolution from above.”21 Yet the label
“Japanizers”, appealing though it may be, is misleading if only because the predominant
inspiration of said intellectuals was less to modernize tradition than to copy the West. Not
only did they openly call for the establishment of Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule through
the disablement of the Ethiopian nobility that they considered as incorrigibly reactionary
and rotten, but most of them had also a profoundly iconoclastic view of Ethiopian culture
and traditions. None of these views reflects the Japanese style, which took, we know, an
integrative course resulting in the incorporation of many traditional elements into the
process of modernization, besides avoiding the path of autocracy.
The alienation of these first intellectuals is best exemplified by Afework Gebre
Yesus, the author of Tobbya. A great admirer of the West, Afework crossed the threshold
of treason by turning into a staunch collaborator of the Italians during their occupation of
Ethiopia. His tragedy is symptomatic of the deep contradiction of the Ethiopian
intellectual movement: he loved Ethiopia as much as he admired the West. The
conviction that the Ethiopian ruling class was utterly reluctant to modernization led him
to endorse colonization as the only means to modernize Ethiopia. The error is to see his
move as an accident or an exception: Afework was simply consistent. For him, since
modernization means Westernization, what matters is the resolution to modernize, not the
specific nationality of the modernizing agent. In this regard, the Ethiopian ruling elite has
demonstrated its non-candidacy by its utter reactionary views and policy. So that,
Afework’s treason, correctly analyzed, reflects the hidden inspiration of all Ethiopians
exposed to Western education, to wit, the longing for colonization. Whether this
colonization is effected by Westerners or natives is immaterial so long as the contents and
the goal are clearly set. We can even say, as Afework did, that the original being better
than the copy, a direct colonization will achieve better results than modernization by
proxy. Accordingly, the truth is that, while some of the first Ethiopian intellectuals, to
quote Bahru Zewde, “may have fleetingly considered foreign rule as a way out for their
country’s backwardness, few went as far as Afework did.”22
The other most important figure among the “Japanizers,” namely, Gebre Hiwot
Baykedagn, while ruling out recourse to foreign rule, arrives at the same image of
Ethiopia in deadlock. For him too, the archaic beliefs and customs of Ethiopia and the
hopelessly conservative attitude of the nobility and the clergy stand in the way of
Ethiopian modernization. The solution is to get rid of these obstacles, the instrument
being this time, not foreign rule, but Western education. The main goal is to produce an
elite capable of replacing the nobility and the clergy. This strategy of replacing the
traditional elite with Western educated state servants had one prerequisite: the rise of an
autocrat who would be powerful enough to marginalize the traditional elite. Thus,
following his belief that what Ethiopia needs is “a man of order, energy, intellect and

21

Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London; Review of African Political Economy,
1975), p. 68.
22
Bahru Zewde, “Review of Alain Rouand’s Afa-Warq 1868-1947: un intellectual ethiopien temoin de son
temps,” in International Journal of African Historical Studies 27, 1 (1994), p. 225.

8
experience . . . who is both a friend of Progress and Absolutism,”23 Gebre Hiwot
identified Haile Selassie as the most appropriate candidate.
The deviations of these two representatives of the early intellectuals of Ethiopia
indicate where lies the difference between them and those of the 60s. Undoubtedly, a
deeper assessment of the Ethiopian deadlock and a complete loss of confidence on the
traditional elite as well as on the emerging modern sectors single out the educated men
and women of the 60s. The reluctance of Haile Selassie to apply reforming measures and
the apparent connivance of the “bourgeois” sectors will lead to greater desperation about
a class or a sector of Ethiopian society ever assuming the leading role in the positive
transformation of Ethiopia. Totally abandoning the Japanizers’ call for an autocrat, the
intellectuals of the 60s came round to the idea that intellectuals themselves must seize
power to implement the necessary reforms.
In this regard, no theory has been more influential than Leninism. In particular,
the views that Lenin develops in his famous book, What Is To Be Done, appeared
relevant to Ethiopia. Under the pretext that in the era of imperialism native aristocratic or
bourgeois classes prefer alliance with imperialist forces to a revolutionary change, Lenin
develops the principle that intellectuals, going beyond their normal role as bureaucrats,
technicians, researchers, educators, and critics, should also become political leaders. To
the perceived deadlock of Third World countries, itself due to the absence of a
revolutionary bourgeoisie, Lenin proposes the theory of revolutionary intellectuals as a
substitute. His argument that power and knowledge must come into the same hands is
further strengthened by his assumption that, left to itself, the working class would be
“able to develop only trade-union consciousness” so that the leadership must pass on to
“the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals” 24 Other Marxist
intellectuals (Antonio Gramsci, Mao Tse-tung, Frantz Fanon, etc.) have added their
voice, turning the conjunction of power and knowledge into a credo of revolutionary
movements in Third World countries.
What is one to conclude from this? That the radicalization of the Ethiopian
student movements and educated circles in the 60s and 70s, especially their strong
leaning toward Marxism-Leninism, no doubt a product of the deferment of reforms, is a
logical development of the growing impact of Western education. To the question why
the reformist option was marginalized, the answer is that the theory that best produced an
iconoclastic analysis of Ethiopia, of its ruling class and beliefs, was none other than
Marxism-Leninism. Despite its undeniable commitment to justice and equality, the theory
echoes the colonial description of native societies by its evolutionary views, its rejection
of traditionality, and most of all, by the historical role that it assigns to the évolués.
Moreover, the theory would not have had such influence were it not arousing and
legitimizing the political ambition of educated circles. In a word, it is the theory that
gives elitism its most powerful backing.

23

Richard Caulk, “Dependency, Gebre Heywet Baykedagn and the Birth of Ethiopian Rformism,” in
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, ed. Robert Hess (Chicago:
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, 1978), p. 572.
24
V.I. Lenin, “What Is To Be Done,” Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 19), vol. 2, p.
53.

9
What we know of Ethiopian student movements and Marxist Leninist parties, be
it the EPRP or MEISON, confirms their elitist drift. All referred to the reality of the
Ethiopian social impasse and, agreeing with Leninism, thought the way out to be the
seizure of political power by radicalized intellectuals. The move creates a new type of
power, that is, a power aiming at liberating the masses rather than enforcing a particular
interest. In a word, it creates a tutorial power: in the name of a class or large sections of
the people, conceived unfit to conquer political hegemony, an enlightened group aspires
to or seizes power. It claims to have the mandate for tutorship until the class or the people
become mature enough to assume the task of self-government. Because politics thus
shifts from administration to domestication, elitism is unthinkable without the assignment
to modernize, itself understood in terms of snatching the ignorant masses from
traditionality. Entirely agreeing with the colonial paradigm of civilizing mission, elitism
asserts that, in light of the larger society being immobilized by centuries of apathy,
fatalism, and barbarism, salvation must come from outside, from the enlightened few.
When leading Ethiopian intellectuals hailed the revolutionary role of organized
intellectuals, little did they realize that they were advocating a revamped version of the
colonial rule.
Most importantly, Ethiopian intellectuals did not realize how implacably they
were heading towards a dictatorial regime in the name of the people. The way they
described themselves and their goal could not but institute dictatorship for the simple
reason that the moral authority and selfness they bestowed on themselves as liberators of
the working peoples turned them into semi-gods with no accountability to any social
force. So disinterested and generous a goal is by definition beyond any question and so
demands absolute submission. This is how a former activist describes his comrades:
“EPRP’s leading activists had no hidden agenda except struggling for what they believed
was just--the well being of the Ethiopian poor . . . I am convinced that Ethiopia still
mourns the death of its brightest and selfless children” 25
In thus presenting themselves as having no particular interest, nay, as being
beyond any interest except the cause of the poor, the intellectuals puffed themselves with
such a moral authority that they soared above accountability, thereby giving themselves
over to the worst type of paternalism. Relations among people can never be on an equal
footing if the one party claims that it has no other interest and motivation than those of
the other party. Such a claim annuls equality by turning the one into a granter and the
other into a grantee. It is high time that intellectuals present themselves to the Ethiopian
peoples as ordinary persons having specific interests and many limitations. Only thus can
they evolve a contractual relationships with the masses whose support they need to
defend their interests in the framework of a pluralist society. Only when they admit that
they have particular interests can they get out of paternalism by clearly understanding
that in defending the interests of the masses they are but defending their own particular
interests. This is called general interest and partnership as a result of solidarity being
created on the basis of mutual interests and not on the one party granting rights to the
other party and deceitfully claiming to be without interest.
Crucially important was that most people became convinced that elitism was the
way to go. Allow me to resort to my own experience. I still remember vividly the time
25
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when people, especially women, were cheering us in the streets with yililta the
first day of the opening of schools after the long vacation of the rainy season. We were
then a bunch of kids going from the gulele area where we lived to the French school of
Lycée Guebre Mariam on foot. Nothing was more expressive of the popular expectation
than this cheering crowd. The Ethiopian saying, yetemare yigdelegn, best incarnates the
expectation that modern schools produce the saviors of Ethiopia. Without doubt, this
popularization of modern education goes to the credit of Haile Selassie. Thanks to his
constant exhortation and the direct involvement of his uncontested authority, the popular
response was not hard to come by: as a scholar notes “even bearded and senior men push
their way into the schools, humbly but determinedly anxious, like their children, to learn
English.”26 The prestige of being Western educated was such that the legitimation of
power became unthinkable without some intellectual halo. And what could be more
sanctifying than the brandishing of the theory of Marxism-Leninism? On top of claiming
to be entirely scientific, the theory has an answer to all the questions. Above all, its deep
humanitarian goals give it an unmatched moral authority. All this worked toward the
belief that Marxism-Leninism alone entitles to power.
The irony, however, is that Ethiopian Marxist-Leninists were beaten at their own
game by a sector of the military apparatus. Consecutive to the overthrow of the imperial
regime, a group of military men, calling itself the Derg, hijacked the Marxist-Leninist
discourse and rose to power by claiming to have the historic mission of leading the
country toward socialism. To crown it all, the man who was among those that the
criterion of high education least advantaged, namely Menguistu Haile Mariam, emerged
as the uncontested leader of the Derg and established an absolute power. Yet, something
of the intellectual justification remained, since Menguistu presented himself as the most
dedicated promoter of Marxism-Leninism. To prove his commitment, in default of
having the intellectual references, Menguistu resorted to terror and killing, the only way
he knew to impress and convinced Ethiopians and the then socialist countries that he was
indeed a true Marxist. This is to say that the intellectualization of power is responsible for
both creating the Derg and causing the erratic and sanguinary behavior of Menguistu. No
sooner is the state viewed as more of a tutor than an administrator, in line with the
colonial idea of civilizing mission, than it ceases to be accountable to the society. You
cannot recognize people as sovereign judges while believing that they are ignorant,
passive, and unable to govern themselves. Democratic attitude requires the respect of the
people, a course of thinking that elitism cannot adopt, diverted as it is by the mentality of
the évolué.
Granted that the exposure to Western education has prepared the ground for the
adoption of Marxist-Leninist approach in Ethiopia, the fact remains that the adherence to
the theory would not have been systematic and widespread without the Eritrean issue.
Though Ethiopia was not colonized, the centeredness of the traditionalist thinking was
irremediably contaminated from within by the annexation of Eritrea, which was an Italian
colony since 1890. The immediate result of the incorporation was that Eritrea became the
Trojan horse of colonialism, especially in schools and among students as well as among
military officers. The undermining from within of Ethiopian centeredness took two
interrelated directions. The one direction has to do with many Eritreans having no or lost
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loyalty to the Ethiopian ruling elite: their involvement in the Ethiopian society
introduced a dissenting voice that was bound to be catching. It specially targeted the
Amhara ruling elite for which most Eritreans had but contempt. Essentially inherited
from the colonial time, this contempt considered the Amhara as utterly backward and the
Eritreans as civilized, évolué. This view made the Amhara rule particularly intolerable so
that the Italian colonization of Ethiopia, though it failed militarily, was revived by the
Eritrean incorporation.
The second direction points to the Eritrean input into the radicalization of
Ethiopian student and intellectual movements. To accommodate the Eritrean dissent,
especially to counter the separatist tendency, the Ethiopian students movements and
intellectuals had to agree to a radical reshuffling of Ethiopian society. They had to
contemplate the end of the monarchy and all that it represents, thereby forsaking the
reformist line. The radical theory of Marxism-Leninism was most welcome as it claimed
to provide a solution to the question of nationalities. As theorized by Marxism-Leninism,
the only genuine response to the Eritrean unrest could only be the absolute equality of all
the nationalities based on the class interests of the working masses and the institution of
regional autonomy. As one former member of the EPRP wrote:
the majority of the Ethiopian radicals did not accept the inevitability of Eritrean
independence. They believed that the recognition of the right to selfdetermination and the expediency of the formation of an independent state were
two separate issues. They were still hopeful that, in the proper circumstances,
class solidarity would prevail over nationalism and Eritreans would choose to
remain with Ethiopia. 27
It is my firm contention that without the attempt to accommodate the Eritrean demands,
no major drift into Marxism-Leninism would have occurred, and by extension, no
ethnicization of Ethiopian politics would have resulted. As in other countries, the radical
option would have attracted a minority while the rest would have stood for a reformist
course.
From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity
Unsurprisingly, the separatist tone of the Eritrean resistance had a great impact on the
Tigrean educated elite. Already sensitized by the protracted rivalry between Amhara and
Tigrean ruling elites and upset by the marginalization of Tigray following the triumphant
establishment of a centralized monarchy under Haile Selassie, the Tigrean educated elite
was but ready to push the ethnic issue as the major problem of Ethiopia. Also,
neighborliness, linguistic identity, blood relationships, etc., worked toward a
rapprochement between Tigrean and Eritrean analyses of Ethiopia even if, it is true, few
Tigreans endorsed the Eritrean view of the Ethiopian state as a colonial rule.
To unravel the connection between Marxist-Leninist ideology and ethnonationalism, it is necessary first to reflect on the colonial ideology itself, especially on the
promotion of the idea of race in conjunction with colonial racism. Indeed, one lasting
legacy of the colonial rule in Africa is the categorization of peoples as belonging to
different and unequal human races. That this colonial heritage has opened the door to the
27
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ethnicization of African social life is not hard to establish. Fanon, for instance, gives
a good idea of the logical connection between race and ethnicity when he elaborates on
his warning that the mere replacement of colonial rulers by Africans will only indulge in
a dependent policy reproducing the syndromes of colonial governments. In postcolonial
Africa, he notes, “we observe a falling back toward old tribal attitudes, and, furious and
sick at heart, we perceive that race feeling in its most exacerbated form is triumphing.”28
Inherited from colonial mentality, the rise of ethnicity is thus nothing more than racism in
the African style. It is definitely an expression of colonized mentality in that it classifies,
separates, excludes peoples on the basis of natural characteristics. To show that the
dependent African elite exactly reproduces the principle of colonial rule, Fanon reminds
us how “by its very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist. Colonialism does
not simply state the existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them.”29
This is to say that people who have come under colonial rule have great
propensity to value ethnic belonging. If so, the conceptualization of ethnic issues as the
major problem of Ethiopia must be attributed to the ethnicization of the Eritrean
opposition, which ethnicization is an outcome of the colonial heritage of Eritrea. For
those who doubt the connection, I remind that the view of Ethiopia as an Amhara colony,
before being espoused by Eritreans and some Oromo intellectuals, was an idea that
Italians had originated to undermine the Ethiopian resistance. They have promoted the
notion of “Greater Tigre” as well as that of “Greater Somalia,” and during the five years
of occupation have divided Ethiopia along ethnic lines to activate “the revolt of the nonAmhara populations such as the Oromo and the Muslims.”30 This reminder of the
colonial authorship of the assimilation of the Ethiopian regime to a colonial rule only
strengthens the extent to which Eritrean and Ethiopian ethno-nationalist movements feed
on the colonial view of Ethiopia.
Naturally, the Eritrean characterization of Ethiopia had a prime seductive effect
on Tigrean and Oromo educated circles. The rivalry between Amhara and Tigrean elites
and the injustice of the land ownership in the south respectively paved the way for the
ethnicization of Tigrean and Oromo intellectuals. While Tigreans denounced Amhara
domination, some Oromo intellectuals, going further in the direction of the colonial
theory, began to target the disintegration of Ethiopia and the emergence of an
independent Oromia. The part played by missionary education in the generation of
Oromo intellectuals committed to secession should not be ignored, given that the
secessionist trend is unthinkable without significant encroachments, Protestant or
otherwise, on the advances of Orthodox Christianity. This authorizes us to characterize
the rise of ethnicity in Ethiopia as a contamination of legitimate grievances with racist
views through the agency of Eritrea. As Leenco Lata admits, “Eritrea’s incorporation into
Ethiopia thus unexpectedly resulted in heightening the grievances of other southern
peoples.”31 Seeing how people easily give in to the pragmatic criterion of success as an
expression of truth, little wonder the definite impact of Eritrean resistance on Ethiopian
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opposition movements has been their growing conviction that ethnicization
conditions success.
Another explanation of the shift from Marxism-Leninism to ethnicity is the
resonance of the ethnic paradigm with the Leninist ideal as it appears in What Is to Be
Done. The odyssey of selfless intellectuals liberating the working people from class
exploitation is replayed with even greater fervor when these intellectuals think of freeing
from ethnic oppression none other than their own kin. Equally relevant to ethnic
mobilization is the Leninist supposition that working people need tutors to defend their
interests. In addition to being taught to identify their separate interests, the ethnically
oppressed need tutors whose devotion is warranted by the sharing of the same blood.
That is why, just as Marxist-Leninists leaders do, ethnic nationalists like to theorize. The
possession of a theory of history is what lifts them from ordinary politicians to saviors
and liberators of their people. This theoretical aptitude, in turn, establishes their exclusive
legitimacy. Just as Marxist-Leninist groups used to claim the exclusive right to represent
the interest of the working masses, so too ethnic movements deny other groups the right
to represent people if they are not ethnically related to them. This battle for legitimacy
was effectively fought in Ethiopia: while the MAESON and the EPRP claimed “the
exclusive right to implement Lenin’s formula in Ethiopia . . . the TPLF adamantly
rejected such a subordination of national liberation struggle to class struggle. By doing
so, it succeeded to fend off these parties’ encroachment into Tigrean society.”32
A pertinent and recent example of the theoretical mania of ethnic movements is
the debate that Meles Zenawi forced on his party to justify the dismissal of his opponents.
The debate introduced the concept of “Banapartism” and the idea of “new
Ethiopianness.”33 Given that Meles had in mind nothing more than the denunciation of
the dangers of corruption, his reference to Bonapartism--a concept borrowed from Karl
Marx--has clearly no other purpose than to link his discourse with a prestigious theory of
revolution. In this way, not only does he impress his Tigrean basis, but he also exposes
the theoretical poverty of his opponents, in particular demotes the military glory that they
brandish at him. One can only agree with those delegates who could find no other way to
express their bewilderment than to ask: “was it necessary to identify the problem as
‘Bonapartism?’”34 Some of them accused Meles of sabotaging the agenda of the meeting
by putting forward an “unnecessary and obscure” notion, “just to pass off as a scholar.”35
Precisely, perfectly aware of the importance of theoretical ascendancy in the
justification of power in Third World countries, Meles grasps with both hands the
opportunity of following in the footsteps of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Kwame Nkrumah, etc.,
by playing the role of the philosopher-king to an audience longing for theoretical
absolutions in default of possessing a high level of intellectual sophistication. We find
theoretical ability ranked as the major requisite for leadership in the interview that Meles
recently gave to Abyotawi Democracy, the official journal of the EPRDF. In that
interview, Meles explains his own ascendancy thus:
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What is important is the clarity of vision. Once you possess clarity in vision
and a correct political line, competent leaders will necessarily emerge. From this
viewpoint, the splinter group’s lack of clarity and incorrect political line is one
that has lost track and is bound to lead them to confusion. It is impossible to
provide competent leadership while one is in such a state of confusion.36
One serious objection springs to mind: insofar as ethnicity is an attempt to return
to the past and revive traditional identities and commitments, is it not contradictory to tie
it to the colonized mind? Is not the search for a precolonial authenticity turning its back
on the colonial legacy and modeling? No doubt, there is some such meaning. However,
other than echoing, as we saw, the racist categorization of colonialism, the shift from
Marxism-Leninism to ethno-nationalism involves the elitist ethos. Indeed, scholars have
been struck by the modernist language of ethnicity: it speaks in terms of justice,
democracy, self-determination, and educated groups are its most ardent supporters and
leaders. Because of this modern content, many scholars rightly warn against any
identification of ethnicity with tribalism. Yet behind the modern and democratic
language, there looms an ascriptive entitlement to power. As one scholar notes, “the
rigidity of ascriptive characteristics that define ethnicity compared to the fluidity of
alternative bases of identity (especially class) accounts for the comparative advantage of
ethnicity in sustaining group solidarity.”37 In going back to the past, elites discover a new
form of entitlement: the ascriptive right of kinship. According to this principle, the
representatives of ethnic groups have or exercise power as a matter of natural right, of
belonging to the same natural group. They are the natural representatives of the group;
their entitlement is in the blood, in the ethnic belonging. No other people have the right to
represent them: others are precisely outsiders. Nor is there a more compelling principle of
unity than natural solidarity; it even transcends classes and common economic interests.
Class mobilization maintains the entrenched disadvantages by subordinating particular
interests to common interests when what excluded groups need is the defense of their
particularity. Because the alleged common interests usually favor the dominant ethnic
group, minority groups prefer ethnic mobilization to class unity.
But then, ethnicity is where the ideology of unanimity, deposited in the Leninist
notion of working masses, achieves its perfect expression. Grant that “ethnic
nationalism” is “a divide-and rule strategy,”38 as Leenco now concedes, and the ethnic
group becomes the embodiment of unanimism: besides having common characteristics
and history, members of an ethnic group are supposed to think alike and to have a
common interest beyond class and status divisions. Better still, ethnic solidarity is
presented as a normative behavior on the grounds that kinspersons are the most devoted
representatives of the ethnic group. No better way exists to deliver a whole people in the
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hands of elitism than to promise a breakaway ethnic state or a state
functioning on the basis of ethnic solidarity.
39
Recall the logic that pushes Nkrumah to argue in favor of the one-party system. It
says that the one-party system “is better able to express and satisfy the common
aspirations of a nation as whole, than a multiple-party parliamentary system, which is in
fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the ‘haves’
and the ‘haves-nots.’”40 Evidently, the principle works beautifully well for ethnicist
politicians whose basic credo is the origination of common aspirations from ethnic
membership. Not only ethnic solidarity replaces class solidarity, the dividing line being
here between the ethnically related and the alien, but also diversity is believed to be
detrimental to the struggle. The notion of ethnicity is thus responsible for illusory
conceptions of unity that loses sight of the social, economic, and ideological diversity
within the ethnic group. From the alleged ethnic identity, it is wrongly deduced that all
members think alike. This allows despots to stifle differences and initiatives in the name
of the ethnic unanimity: all that is dynamic, plural, and democratic is stigmatized as unethnical.
The enthronement of the enlightened few, who alone illuminate the road to
freedom, follows as a matter of course. Nothing is more captivating than the elitist image
of rescuer: dragged from their natural society and subjugated to an alien power, the
oppressed ethnic groups need the tutorial leadership that puts them back into their
authentic and original milieu. The ethnicist leader who claims to deliver his people from
ethnic oppression gives no different spectacle from, say, that of Nkrumah forcefully
implementing African socialism on a people that he otherwise declared to be socialist by
tradition. In both cases, the elitist slip clearly transpires in the call for a tutorial state.
There is no disparity between the ethnic principle of popular mobilization behind the
enlightened few and Nkrumah’s pronouncement on the success of the anti-colonial
struggle. For both movements, success depends on the intervention of those who control
knowledge. As Nkrumah puts it,
this triumph must be accompanied by knowledge. For in the way that the process
of natural evolution can be aided by human intervention based upon knowledge,
so social evolution can be helped along by political intervention based upon
knowledge of the laws of social development.41
Clearly, then, the imperative of a mass party guided by the enlightened few is how
power and knowledge fall into the same hands, and government, thus armed with an
ideology, changes into tutorship. The ethnic ideology of the return to the source gives a
messianic stature to local elites, turn them into rescuers of the oppressed. Once ethnic
solidarity becomes the principal rule, it stifles all dissident views by authorizing the
characterization of all internal opposition as a betrayal of common interests. It exactly
institutes unanimity around the leadership canonized as the sole interpreter of the
interests of the ethnic group. As was the case with Marxist-Leninist groups, this apology
of unanimism is a justification for dictatorial regimes and undemocratic methods of
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ruling. If both ideologies converge on the necessity of the one-party system and the
banishment of dissident views as well as on the rejection of individualism and the praise
of the collective, it is because they work toward the goal of consecrating the absolute
power of the enlightened few. The attraction of Marxist-Leninist groups to ethnicity is
therefore inherent in the nature of ethnicity itself. If, as Leenco remarks, “the members of
the fronts that were more successful in implementing the Leninist organizational strategy
tended not only to act as one person but to speak as one, too,”42 how much more so may
ethnic leaders and the ethnic society they fashion.
This analysis of ethnicity must not be interpreted as a condemnation of ethnic
politics in Ethiopia. The fact that an excluded group organizes itself and fights the
exclusion cannot be rejected without going against democratization. Moreover, the
inclusion of pluralism strongly favors the development of modern values by stimulating
openness and competition. What is adverse, however, is the tendency of ethnic politics to
harbor a separatist spirit by identifying the nation with the ethnic group. The use of
ethnicity to break up the state confuses what is essentially a problem of democratization
with the emergence of a new ethnic state whose democratization is yet to come. Because
ethnically related people now control the state, issues pertaining to democratization and
modernization are not done away with yet. On the contrary, the ideology of relatedness
can even get tougher to democratize inasmuch as it is little prone to the impersonalization
of the state. The question is then to know to what extent the defense of the ascriptive
rights of ethnicity is compatible with the principle of modernity decreeing the
dependence of the status and place of individuals on their achievement. Unless the
entitlement promoted by ethnicity is reconciled with the competitive principle, the style
of household politics will prevail to the detriment of public accountability and democratic
rules.
One of the major reasons for the proliferation of corruption in the Ethiopian
society is the excessive valorization of relatedness to the disadvantage of impersonal
relations and accountability. To recognize corruption as the major scourge of the
Ethiopian society is to admit the corrosive effect of ethnicization. Blaming
“Bonapartism” only creates a muddle that may retard the admittance of a wrong policy,
but does not reduce, even slightly, the evil. The present crackdown of the government on
corruption, assuming that it is sincere, can succeed only if the system is so changed that a
growing impersonalization of Ethiopian society takes place. This means the promotion of
pan-Ethiopian standards in conjunction with the operation of free market relations, in
short, the urgent need to get out of the ethnic paradigm.
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